

The Kalobeyei Settlement: A Self-reliance Model for Refugees?

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In 2016, the Kalobeyei refugee settlement was created, just 3.5 kilometres from the Kakuma camps in Kenya. In a departure from Kenya's policy of not allowing refugees to work, its aim was to provide self-reliance to refugees and greater refugee–host interaction. But are refugee policies and programmes in Kalobeyei really different from those in Kakuma? If so, what are the differences? And do these differences actually translate into different self-reliance outcomes for refugees? Drawing upon a mixed-methods approach, we compare aid models, self-reliance enabling factors and self-reliance outcomes between Kalobeyei and Kakuma. After just 15 months, we find that self-reliance-enabling factors—such the environment, assets, networks, markets and public goods—remain similar across both sites and, in some cases, are better in Kakuma. The major differences between the sites are in the aid model: Kalobeyei's cash-assistance and agricultural programmes. We find improved nutritional outcomes and a greater perception of autonomy in Kalobeyei, both of which may be attributable to differences in the aid models. These findings have implications for how we conceptualize the institutional design of self-reliance in Kalobeyei and elsewhere.

Keywords: Refugees, self-reliance, Kenya, Kakuma, Kalobeyei, political economy

Introduction

Kenya is not generally associated with progressive refugee policies. It has adopted an 'encampment' policy for refugees since the early 1990s, placing legal restrictions on their right to work and freedom of movement (Milner 2009; Lindley 2011; Carrier 2017). However, in 2015, the government of Kenya quietly embarked on a potentially significant shift away from the

status quo. It agreed to create a new refugee settlement that would support self-reliance for refugees and greater interaction with the host community. The Kalobeyei settlement was conceived as a joint initiative of the government of Turkana County and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2015, just 3.5 kilometres from the Kakuma camps, in Turkana County. The new Kalobeyei settlement opened its doors to refugees in 2016 and is now home to around 37,500 refugees (Table 1).

Kalobeyei¹ represents an innovation with wider significance for the international refugee regime. Designed from scratch as a new settlement for both refugees and members of the host community, it offers a potential alternative to closed refugee camps or urban settlements. It is the first settlement of its kind: designed for refugees and hosts, based on market principles and intended to endure after refugees have gone home. UNHCR (2018) has highlighted that this is an experiment with wider global significance:

There is the old part of Kakuma. And then there is the new part, called Kalobeyei. And that's something we really wanted to highlight here. It represents our new approach that is going global to refugee response (UNHCR 2018b).

As a model, it exemplifies the goals of UNHCR's Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF): supporting host communities, offering self-reliance and promoting a development-based approach to assistance (UNHCR 2018a).

In the initial settlement plans, Kalobeyei's stated aim was to transition refugee assistance from an aid-based model to a self-reliance model. It was anticipated that refugees in the Kakuma camp would relocate voluntarily to Kalobeyei. The plans showed refugees living on one side, hosts on the other, with shared markets, schools and hospitals in the middle (UNHCR 2016a). Soon after inception, the unexpected arrival of large numbers of South Sudanese refugees meant that the model had to be adapted to provide some emergency relief. Despite this, Kalobeyei has retained a significant commitment to its original goals of offering integrated settlement based on self-reliance.

But, in practice, are the policies and programmes implemented in Kalobeyei really different from those implemented in Kakuma? Do we observe different self-reliance outcomes between recently arrived refugees in Kalobeyei and Kakuma, one year after the creation of the settlement? In order to explore these questions, we used a mixed-method approach that combines conceptual reasoning, quantitative research and qualitative research.

First, we built an original conceptual framework to organize the different aspects of self-reliance into a coherent model. Self-reliance is both an ability to meet essential needs in a sustainable manner and a type of programme that

Table 1

	All refugees		Recent arrivals (post March 2015) Kakuma
	Kalobeyei	Kakuma	
South Sudan	71%	52%	70%
Ethiopia	13%	4%	2%
Burundi	9%	4%	8%
DR Congo	4%	6%	9%
Uganda	2%	1%	2%
Sudan	1%	6%	8%
Somalia	0%	26%	1%
Total population	37,471	145,406	17,814

strengthens livelihoods and resilience, and reduces dependence on humanitarian aid (UNHCR 2005). We translated UNHCR's understanding of self-reliance into a conceptual framework. We conceptualize self-reliance as a process through which self-reliance inputs (a combination of enabling factors and aid programmes) lead to self-reliance outcomes (socio-economic outcomes and autonomy).

Second, we conducted a large-scale quantitative survey of recent arrivals in Kalobeyei settlement and Kakuma camp. Our quantitative research design had two purposes. The first is to provide a description of self-reliance inputs and outcomes in Kalobeyei settlement in September 2017, by surveying a representative sample of South Sudanese, Ethiopian and Burundian refugees living in the settlement. The second is to compare self-reliance inputs and outcomes between Kalobeyei and Kakuma in September 2017, by comparing the situation of South Sudanese recent arrivals living in both sites. In total, we collected 2,560 surveys in August and September 2017. Our use of statistics in this article is mainly descriptive. It is worth noting that the settlement of South Sudanese refugees in Kalobeyei has the features of a quasi-experiment, which enables meaningful comparison between the two contexts. In particular, refugees' allocation across the two sites was not based on population characteristics, but on two exogenous cut-off dates between which newly arrived refugees had to settle in Kalobeyei.

Third, we conducted two waves of qualitative fieldwork between July and August 2017 and in November 2017 in order to elaborate on survey results and to explore lines of inquiry that could not be addressed through a closed-ended questionnaire. We mainly used focus-group discussions and semi-structured interviews. Across the two sites, we conducted 15 focus-group discussions and more than 40 semi-structured interviews with refugees of different nationalities. In addition, we interviewed important non-refugee

stakeholders, including staff members of relevant United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), government officials in charge of refugee issues and members of the local host community.

About 15 months after the first arrivals in Kalobeyei, we find that self-reliance-enabling factors are limited in both Kalobeyei and Kakuma, across nearly all our indicators: environment, assets, access to networks, access to markets and access to public goods. In a few areas, Kakuma actually performs slightly better, which is not surprising given the very young age of the settlement. The only important differences between the two sites relate to their respective aid models. We find that Kalobeyei is not a pure ‘self-reliance’ model and Kakuma is not or pure ‘aid’ model; they occupy contrasting positions on that spectrum. Kalobeyei has a number of policy features that distinguish it from the nearby Kakuma camps. First, it makes extensive use of a cash-assistance programme called Bamba Chakula (‘get your food’ in Swahili), which has been used on a limited scale in Kakuma. Second, it promotes dry land agriculture through the promotion of ‘kitchen gardens’.

In terms of self-reliance outcomes, we measured better nutritional outcomes and greater perceived autonomy in Kalobeyei. From that perspective, Kalobeyei currently represents a different—and slightly more successful—aid model than Kakuma. Observed differences in nutritional outcomes and perceived autonomy may be due to observed differences in the aid model, although it is beyond the scope of this article to definitely test this hypothesis empirically.

Our research contributes to the literature on refugee self-reliance and refugee livelihoods. Our conceptual framework enriches the existing literature on self-reliance (e.g. Beversluis *et al.* 2017; Easton-Calabria and Omata 2018; RefugePoint 2018) by demonstrating the need to view self-reliance as a multi-dimensional process, and by clarifying the relationship between its different component parts. The existing literature tends to emphasize either the agency of refugees themselves achieving self-reliance in spite of government regulation or the creation of structural enabling environments through auspicious government regulation (e.g. Meyer 2006; Werker 2007; Omata 2018). In contrast, our analysis offers fresh insights into the role that international programmes may play in promoting self-reliance and aims to advance our understanding of the process and mechanism by which refugees’ economic wellbeing can be nurtured by multiple factors. It interrogates the extent to which self-reliance can be ‘designed’ through the policies of aid agencies. Our research also contributes to the wider literature on refugee livelihoods (see e.g. Jacobsen 2005; Horst 2006; Jacobsen 2014) and the economics of forced migrations (see e.g. Zetter *et al.* 2012; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2013; Alloush *et al.* 2017) by studying a new context—the Kalobeyei settlement—and comparing it to the older and more extensively studied Kakuma camps (see e.g. Sanghi *et al.* 2016; Alix-Garcia *et al.* 2018).

Context

Kakuma camp is located in the remote and impoverished Turkana County in north-west Kenya. De facto Kenya's seventh largest city, Kakuma camp is home to 145,000 refugees mainly from South Sudan and Somalia (Table 1). Opened in 1992, it has long been characterized by dependency and overshadowed by international focus on Kenya's large Dadaab camps on the other side of the country. Like all refugees in Kenya, the population has been subject to Kenya's strict policies limiting freedom of movement and the right to work.

Gradually, though, the local authorities in Turkana County recognized that the regional economy benefits enormously from the presence of refugees and international aid agencies. The region's governor, Josphat Nanok, has become a champion for a new market-based model, seeking to maximize the benefits to the host population (interview with UNHCR staff, July 2018). He described his aim as 'to see how we can develop a programme that is not only supportive to refugees but also provides support to local communities' (TED 2018). Partly as a result, Kakuma has become a focus for UNHCR's attempts to develop innovative, market-based solutions for refugees (Sanghi 2016; IFC 2018).

The most globally notable innovation in Kakuma is its new integrated settlement: Kalobeyei. For the first time, anywhere in the world, a refugee settlement has been especially designed to enable refugees and the host community to live side by side, sharing markets, schools and hospitals. Designed in 2015 and kick-started with a 15 million Euro grant from the European Union, it opened in May 2016.²

The plans for Kalobeyei have evolved iteratively over time. In 2015, UNHCR and the Turkana government's primary aim was

to decongest the Kakuma refugee camps but ... [to] do so in a manner that would promote the self-reliance of refugees and host communities by providing them with better livelihoods opportunities and enhanced service delivery.

UNHCR designed the Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic Development Program (KISED P)—a multi-agency collaborative plan to develop the local economy and service delivery over a 14 years period until 2030 (UNHCR 2016b).

Self-reliance has been a central aim of Kalobeyei since inception. The background documents site UNHCR's Alternatives to Camps strategy and the European Union's Lives in Dignity: From Aid Dependency to Self-Reliance as key sources of inspiration. The initial site master plans, created by UN-HABITAT, show refugees and hosts living either side of a shared marketplace and integrated services like schools and hospitals. The initial KISED P plans contrast Kalobeyei's model to the 'care and maintenance' model of Kakuma and highlight the integration of Kalobeyei into the

Turkana County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP) as an important example of this contrast (EU 2016; UNHCR 2016b).

Although the initial plans outlined the parameters of a strategy built around key phases, they left specific projects and programmes open for development by partner agencies within KISEDIP's iterative five-year plans, to be co-led by UNHCR, the World Bank and the County Government. The early plans, though, had a clear vision for the kind of settlement Kalobeyei aimed to become:

Key characteristics are sustainable urban and agricultural/livestock development for the host community and refugees, non-discriminatory services for both, avoidance of parallel service deliveries, and private sector involvement. Both refugees and host communities will benefit from: (a) investments in basic infrastructure in access to social services; and (b) increased opportunities for supporting income generating activities. The program will include features to promote community participation and ownership (UNHCR 2016a: 17).

This vision would be implemented across four main phases covering sectors such as health, food and nutrition, education, child safety, economic resilience and social cohesion. The initial phase envisaged the establishment of Kalobeyei's infrastructure and that it would receive up to 60,000 refugees relocated from Kakuma. However, the unanticipated outbreak of violence in South Sudan and Burundi led to new arrivals from those countries throughout 2016 and 2017. Kalobeyei has therefore instead taken new arrivals, notably those fleeing fresh rounds of violence in South Sudan and Burundi. The first arrivals began settling in Kalobeyei from May 2016. Fifteen months later, when we conducted our research, some 37,500 refugees and 2,000 Kenyan nationals were living in Kalobeyei. Figure 1 shows the geography and lay-out of the new site in relation to Kakuma.

Most refugees living in Kalobeyei settlement are South Sudanese, Burundian or Ethiopian (Table 1). The contexts of their displacement and arrival are diverse. South Sudanese refugees have been arriving in Kenya at a high but steady rate since the outbreak of civil war in late 2013. On the other hand, Ethiopians in Kalobeyei are mainly transfers, relocated when the government of Kenya made plans to close the Dadaab camps. Many of these Ethiopians are ethnic Somalis displaced from Ethiopia's Ogaden region due to conflict between government and secessionist forces. Many of them, especially Somali Ethiopians, had their own enterprises in Dadaab, which they developed over years of exile there. Unlike South Sudanese new arrivals, the Ethiopian transfers had enough time to make a collective family decision on whether to move together to the new settlement. Finally, the majority of Burundian refugees fled political violence following the elections of 2015 in which President Pierre Nkurunziza rejected constitutional term limits and sought a third term. A failed coup attempt led to severe state repression and a sudden wave of displacement into neighbouring countries.



Figure 1
Map Showing Kalobeyei Settlement and Kakuma Camp

Theory

Given Kalobeyei's objective of promoting self-reliance, our deductive starting point is to disaggregate the notion of self-reliance and translate it into a meaningful conceptual framework. We start from UNHCR (2005)'s definition of self-reliance. Self-reliance is defined both as 'the social and economic ability of an individual, a household or a community to meet essential needs (including protection, food, water, shelter, personal safety, health and education) in a sustainable manner and with dignity' and as a *programme approach* based on 'developing and strengthening livelihoods of persons of concern, and reducing their vulnerability and long-term reliance on humanitarian/external assistance' (UNHCR 2005).

Four elements of this definition capture our attention: (i) the list of needs or socio-economic outcomes, (ii) the objectives of sustainability and independence, (iii) the concept of ability and (iv) the notions of programmes and of humanitarian/external assistance. We organize these concepts within a diagram (Figure 2). As with every diagram, it represents a parsimonious simplification of reality. Nevertheless, it clarifies the concept of self-reliance and the relationship between its component parts. Importantly, the framework shaped the design of our survey tools and our subsequent analysis.³

Crucially, and in contrast to many uses of the concept, our framework (Figure 2) makes it clear that self-reliance is not limited to a list of needs or socio-economic outcomes. Rather, we conceptualize self-reliance as a process through which aid programmes and a combination of enabling factors shape people's ability to achieve acceptable socio-economic outcomes independently.




Figure 2
Conceptual Framework for Understanding Self-reliance in Relation to Refugees

On the right-hand side of the diagram, we illustrate the outcomes of self-reliance, in terms of socio-economic welfare (access to food, water, shelter, protection and personal safety, health and education) and autonomy (independence from aid). To be fully self-reliant, individuals, households or communities need both acceptable socio-economic outcomes and autonomy from aid. People cannot be characterized as self-reliant if they achieve high standard of living but are fully reliant on aid. Nor are they self-reliant if they do not benefit from aid, but are materially deprived.

The left-hand side of the diagram illustrates two categories of self-reliance inputs. On the one hand, the self-reliance-enabling factors shape people’s ability to meet their needs autonomously. Enabling factors are not explicitly listed in UNHCR’s definition. However, the toolkits provided in the *Handbook for Self-reliance* provide an extensive list of factors that are likely to play a role in refugee contexts. We classify these into five categories of enabling factors: the environment (regulation, refugee–host interaction, physical environment and natural resources), assets (human capital, physical capital and identity), access to networks (remittances, informal credit and insurance, and nepotism), access to markets (labour markets, markets for goods and services, and capital markets including banking) and access to public goods (health care, education provision, water and sanitation, roads

and security). The enabling factors contribute to socio-economic outcomes by enabling the economic activities of individuals, households and communities, including through income-generating activities.

On the other hand, aid has an ambivalent effect on self-reliance outcomes. Humanitarian aid aims at providing refugees' immediate needs, especially in emergency contexts. Development aid aims at setting up and strengthening enabling factors, and thereby fostering socio-economic welfare in the medium or long run. But aid also reduces refugees' autonomy in the short run (aid that improves self-reliance enabling factors can foster autonomy in the long run). Aid therefore has the ambivalent effect of directly and indirectly enhancing socio-economic outcomes but potentially reducing autonomy.

The framework also emphasizes that feedback loops exist between socio-economic outcomes and enabling factors: individuals, households and communities can invest or contribute to strengthen enabling factors (individually, in association or through the state) and thereby encourage long-run sustainable development.

It is worth noting that our framework is not the first attempt to conceptualize self-reliance with the objective of measuring the concept. The NGO RefugeePoint engaged in an academic collaboration to create the 25-item Refugee Integration Scale (RIS) (Beverluis *et al.* 2017). The scale was developed inductively through a survey covering 331 refugees in Nairobi and has elements relating to language and culture, safety and stability, social bonds, bridges and links, employment, housing, education, health, rights and citizenship. Using the RIS as a point of departure, RefugeePoint developed the 'Self-Reliance Index' (SRI) (Refuge Point 2018), which covers nine different domains such as education, safety, employment and income. The SRI represents a pioneering attempt at assessing refugees' self-reliance. Still, the index has some limitations. For instance, the proposed index is designed only for refugees in non-camp settings, leaving camp-based refugees beyond its scope. More fundamentally, the relationship between different components of the indicator remains unexplained, thereby making it hard to systematically analyse what factors actually contribute to increasing or decreasing the level of refugees' self-reliance. Our conceptual framework addresses these limitations by linking the different dimensions of self-reliance in a coherent diagram that applies to all refugee contexts.

Methodology

Quantitative data collection took place in August and September 2017. Our sampling strategy had two objectives. First, we aimed to provide a representative picture of aid models, self-reliance-enabling factors and self-reliance outcomes in the new Kalobeyei settlement. For this purpose, our target population in Kalobeyei consists of refugees from South Sudan, Ethiopia and Burundi, as these nationalities represent 93 per cent of the settlement population (Table 1).

Second, we aimed to compare the situation of recent arrivals in Kalobeyei and in Kakuma, and thereby determine the Kalobeyei model makes a difference. For this purpose, we also interviewed a representative sample of South Sudanese recent arrivals in Kakuma.

Our use of statistics in this article is mainly descriptive; causal claims will be avoided. Still, we emphasize that the settlement of South Sudanese refugees in Kalobeyei and Kakuma has the features of a quasi-experiment, which enables meaningful comparison of the two contexts. UNHCR registration data indeed shows that refugees' allocation across the two sites was not based on population characteristics, but on two exogenous cut-off dates: 24 May 2016 and 22 June 2017, between which newly arrived refugees had to settle in Kalobeyei:

1. Of refugees who registered between 1 March 2015 and 23 May 2016, 97 per cent were living in Kakuma.
2. Of refugees who registered between 24 May 2016 and 21 June 2017, 93 per cent were living in Kalobeyei.
3. Of refugees who registered between 22 June 2017 and the beginning of our survey on 24 August 2017, 100 per cent were living in Kakuma.

The key threshold of 24 May 2016 is about 15 months before the beginning of our survey. We therefore define recent arrivals as refugees who registered up to 30 months before the beginning of our survey. Our research focuses on these 'recent arrivals'. Undertaking an impact evaluation based on a regression discontinuity design approach will be the focus of our future work.

Our initial plan was to use the UNHCR's registration data to randomly select our sample. However, the exact location of refugees within Kalobeyei was missing or inaccurate for about 80 per cent of households within the UNHCR data. In order to sample in Kalobeyei, we therefore used a satellite image, from which we randomly selected 10 per cent of refugee shelters. UNHCR registration data was much more accurate in Kakuma, enabling us to use it to randomly sample for the South Sudanese stratum in Kakuma. In order to capture intra-household dynamics, we interviewed not only household heads, but also the person who usually prepares the household food and one additional adult randomly selected from each household.

For the survey, we recruited 20 enumerators from the South Sudanese refugee communities and four enumerators in charge of the Burundian and Ethiopian communities in Kalobeyei. Enumerators were trained for one week. The questionnaire included questions on all dimensions of Figure 2. It was translated into Bari, Burundi, Dinka, Juba Arabic, Nuer and Somali. As summarized in Table 2, we interviewed 2,560 adults from 1,397 households. Sampling weights are accounted for in the analysis below. Figures show 95 per cent confidence intervals.

We supplemented our survey with qualitative data collection, which took place between July and August 2017 and in November 2017. The purpose

Table 2

Sample Characteristics					
	Total	Kakuma SSD	SSD	Kalobeyei BDI	ETH
Individuals	2,560	1,106	927	250	277
Households	1,397	509	629	131	128

was to explore lines of inquiry that could not be addressed through closed survey questions. Our main methods were focus-group discussions and semi-structured interviews. Across two sites, we conducted 15 focus-group discussions and more than 40 semi-structured interviews with refugees of different nationalities. In addition, we interviewed important non-refugee stakeholders, including staff from international organizations, NGOs, the government and members of the local host community.

Empirical Findings

In this section, we apply the self-reliance conceptual framework (Figure 2) to compare self-reliance in Kalobeyei and Kakuma about 15 months after the creation of the settlement. We identify similarities and differences in terms of aid models, self-reliance-enabling factors and self-reliance outcomes.

Access to Aid

As of 2017, the scope of aid is largely the same in both sites (UNHCR 2017). It includes health, education, livelihoods and legal assistance. However, two programmes are of much greater scale in Kalobeyei settlement compared to Kakuma camp, namely Bamba Chakula and kitchen gardens.

The Bamba Chakula programme is a restricted system of cash transfers designed by the World Food Programme (WFP) as an alternative to in-kind food aid. Refugees receive mobile money on their phones every month. The mobile money can be used at the shops of registered traders to purchase food items of their choice from a list of approved items. The shop owners can then exchange that credit for cash. By providing refugees with currency rather than in-kind food items, Bamba Chakula allows recipients to choose the food items that suit their preferences while supporting the growth of local markets. Refugees act as consumers rather than simply recipients. Bamba Chakula is therefore characterized by two restrictions. First, the mobile money can only be used to purchase designated food items. Second, the mobile money is only redeemable with registered Bamba Chakula traders—a constraint intended to allow the government to monitor the use of money transfers. At the point of the data collection in 2017, there were about 50

Bamba Chakula retailers operating in Kalobeyei, and about 200 Bamba Chakula retailers in Kakuma.

In Kalobeyei, food assistance is almost completely provided through Bamba Chakula, whereas, in Kakuma, beneficiaries receive a mix of Bamba Chakula and in-kind food aid. Refugees in Kalobeyei receive the equivalent of 1,400 KES (14 USD) per month per person, along with a small in-kind supplement of 1.2 kilograms of corn–soya blend (CSB)—a nutritious powdered supplement used to make porridge. Meanwhile, Kakuma residents receive 500 KES (5 USD) per month for single-person households ('size 1') and 300 KES (3 USD) per month per person for households of two or more ('size 2'), along with an in-kind food basket whose content varies each month, depending on availability (typically 6–9 kilograms of maize or sorghum, 1.8 kilograms of pulse, 1.2 kilograms of CSB and 1 litre of oil per person per month). The value of these transfers is supposed to be equivalent to that in Kalobeyei and Kakuma.

The promotion of agriculture is the other important programme to encourage self-reliance in Kalobeyei. Of course, agriculture is also encouraged in Kakuma, but to a lesser extent. Two types of programmes can be distinguished. Kitchen gardens are small plots cultivated in the open space adjacent to shelters. Most gardens use the 'sunken-plot' technique designed to grow vegetables in contexts of limited water: holes of about 45 centimetres are dug and filled partway with topsoil. The soil is mixed with manure and spread on top, creating a surface layer that prevents desiccation of the soil beneath. Community plots are larger plots located along the streams that run through Kalobeyei settlement and Kakuma camp. Promoting agriculture to encourage self-reliance makes sense, as more than 80 per cent of South Sudanese and Burundian refugees were involved in agriculture in their country of origin (Figure 3).

In Kalobeyei, 36 per cent of South Sudanese refugees have a kitchen garden, compared with 24 per cent of South Sudanese in Kakuma (Figure 4a). However, involvement is strongly correlated with refugees' arrival date because agricultural development takes time and resources (Figure 4b): about two-thirds of the first South Sudanese arrivals in Kalobeyei maintain a kitchen garden, while only about 20 per cent of the most recent arrivals do so. The percentage of people involved in agriculture in Kalobeyei is therefore expected to grow over time. The produce harvested from the kitchen gardens is mainly used to supplement and diversify household consumption, with 84 per cent of households self-consuming all their production. Only one household from our sample is involved in a community plot. The two main barriers to kitchen-garden cultivation are lack of water and lack of seeds, as noted by 90 per cent and 66 per cent of respondents, respectively. Other important barriers are the lack of equipment (29 per cent) and the poor quality of the soil (21 per cent).




Figure 3
Percentage of Refugees Who Were Engaged in Agriculture in Their Country of Origin

Self-reliance-enabling Factors

Environment

The physical environments surrounding both Kakuma and Kalobeyei are similar. Both sites are located in Turkana County in north-west Kenya—a historically marginalized area approximately 1,000 kilometres from Nairobi. Far from large commercial hubs, the area has long been excluded from major investments or development activities by the Kenyan government, private enterprises or international agencies (Omata 2016). Because of the arid climate, scarcity of water and poor soil quality, the inhabitants of Turkana County have been limited to drought-resistant sorghum varieties of crops, which can supplement livestock-based livelihoods. However, local livelihoods are diversifying with the rise of small urban centres, such as Kakuma town, located next to Kakuma camp.

Refugees in both Kakuma and Kalobeyei have the same regulatory environment. Although the concept of Kalobeyei settlement is based upon agreement between national and international stakeholders to promote self-reliance for refugees, many of the regulatory constraints imposed on refugees in Kakuma camp are applied in the Kalobeyei settlement. For instance, as in the Kakuma camp, refugees in Kalobeyei must request travel permission for any distant trips beyond neighbouring Kakuma. Restrictions on refugees'




Figure 4 (a) Involved in Agriculture in Each Sub-sample. (b) Percentage of South Sudanese Refugees Involved in Agriculture in Kakuma and Kalobeyei by Arrival Date

The red dashed line represents the first cut-off date (24 May 2016). The 81 observations after the second cut-off date have been dropped.

right to work have also been kept in Kalobeyi. One Livelihoods Officer at a UNHCR implementing partner explained: ‘The Kenyan government is reluctant to give refugees travel permission for national security reasons ... Kalobeyi is increasingly regulated like the Kakuma camp. They are not that different now.’⁴ Refugees also face restrictions on the goods that they can produce due to explicit bans on refugee participation in particular sectors such as the sale of livestock or forest resources, which are protected activities of the host community. They have also been prevented from brewing alcohol.

Relationships with local host populations are a key factor shaping refugees’ lives and livelihoods in exile. Refugee interactions with the local Turkana people include trade in locally procured goods such as charcoal and firewood.⁵ In Kakuma, while there are points of both compatibility and conflict, there is an overall sense of mutual benefit, including years of spill-over benefits of humanitarian aid for host populations (Sanghi *et al.* 2016; Alix-Garcia *et al.* 2018).

Unlike Kakuma, neighbouring host nationals living near to Kalobeyi have not yet seen many positive impacts of hosting refugees. One staff member of the UNHCR partner agency in Kalobeyi described the perception of the Turkana communities towards refugees in Kalobeyi:

Host people are frustrated. They think refugees are getting many benefits but not locals... Many local leaders think UNHCR did not deliver what they promised to do in Kalobeyi. They are now quite sceptical [of the Kalobeyi settlement].⁶

Refugees in Kalobeyi also had a negative view to host communities. In a focus-group discussion with 16 Ethiopian refugees in Kalobeyi, participants described their negative conceptions of the Turkana host community:

[Turkana are] very hostile people. Many of us were attacked by Turkana when we picked up dead wood on the ground [to be used as firewood]. They threatened us many times! They said ‘This is our land. Refugees should contribute to us’.⁷

Assets

The human capital and physical capital of refugees should affect their ability to start income-generating activities or access employment. Yet, levels of education and asset-holding are low in both Kalobeyi and Kakuma.

Across the two sites, the education level of refugees appears to be limited, especially amongst South Sudanese recent arrivals in Kalobeyi (Figure 5a). Most of the South Sudanese indeed come from rural areas, with limited access to education. The significant difference between South Sudanese recent arrivals in Kalobeyi and Kakuma does not seem to stem from programmatic or demographic differences between the two sites, as there is no significant difference around the cut-off date (Figure 5b). Rather, the




Figure 5
(a) Years of Education in Each Sub-sample. (b) Years of Education by Arrival Date (Only South Sudanese)

The red dashed line represents the first cut-off date (24 May 2016). The 81 observations after the second cut-off date are dropped.

difference can be explained by the fact that 40 per cent of the South Sudanese interviewees report accessing education and refugees in Kakuma have had of course more time to benefit from education in the camp (Figure 13). This also explains the downward slope in Figure 5b.

A considerable number of South Sudanese households living in Kalobeyei and Kakuma are female-headed (Figure 6). Only half of the South Sudanese adults interviewed live with their spouse, whereas this proportion was much higher for Burundian and Ethiopian households (96 per cent and 87 per cent, respectively). The following response of Jilda, a South Sudanese refugee in her early fifties, illustrates the circumstances of many from her community. Her family was living in Equatoria and made a living from farming and animal husbandry. When asked how she fled from South Sudan, she responded:

Government soldiers suddenly came to our villages and started shooting. We started running away. I slipped and distorted my leg [she cannot walk without a stick]. I took my children and grandchildren with me. I could not meet my husband then ... I don't know whether my husband is still alive or not.⁸

Now she lives with her two children and two grandchildren, and she is entirely reliant on assistance from international organizations. Jilda deplored how hard her household's life is in Kalobeyei, as her husband was a breadwinner in South Sudan. As discussed later, the absence of male adults can limit the range of economic activities of households.

Asset ownership is very low in both Kalobeyei and Kakuma. Only 0.7 per cent of the households have a television, 0.9 per cent own a computer, 0.5 per cent own a generator and 2.9 per cent of refugees own a bicycle. We observe some variation across camps and nationalities. Ethiopians in Kalobeyei and South Sudanese in Kakuma—especially in Kakuma 1—display slightly higher ownership of these assets. This can be explained by the fact that South Sudanese in Kakuma arrived on average earlier than refugees in Kalobeyei and Ethiopians carried some assets from Dadaab to Kalobeyei. In a series of focus-group discussions, South Sudanese participants reiterated:

We fled in panic. Suddenly our village was attacked. We grabbed whatever was around us and ran away. No time to carry assets or money or even to meet family members.⁹

One asset owned by a substantial proportion of refugees across all groups is a mobile phone. Ownership rates range from about 30 per cent for South Sudanese refugees living in Kalobeyei to about 50 per cent for South Sudanese refugees living in Kakuma as well as Burundian refugees living in Kalobeyei, and about 70 per cent for Ethiopian refugees living in Kalobeyei.

Access to Networks

In refugee populations, forced displacement often results in expanded networks and, in some cases, family dispersal provides refugees with access to




Figure 6
Spouse Living in Kakuma/Kalobeyei

financial resources such as international remittances. Yet, amongst our target populations in Kakuma and Kalobeyei, the percentage of those with remittance access is generally low.

Most respondents receive no remittances from their networks (Figure 7). Of South Sudanese, 11 per cent of those living in Kakuma receive transfers from their networks, while only 6 per cent of those in Kalobeyei do. Fifteen per cent of Ethiopians receive transfers, whereas just 1 per cent of Burundians surveyed receive transfers. We confirmed this in a focus-group discussion with (Somali) Ethiopian refugees, where participants commented: ‘Maybe 10% of Somali Ethiopians receive money but they have to go to Kakuma to get money.’¹⁰

Although the number is small, some South Sudanese new arrivals do receive remittances from relatives in South Sudan. Grace, a 28-year-old South Sudanese refugee in Kalobeyei, is one of these exceptional cases. She runs a small business selling food items, which she began in 2017: ‘my brother in South Sudan sent me 5000 South Sudanese pounds [about US\$38] from Juba.’¹¹ Her business is a so-called ‘table-shop’ with few items for sale. With only 5,000 South Sudanese pounds (US\$38), what she can do is limited.

Limited access to international remittances amongst South Sudanese refugees in both sites is understandable because very few of them have had access to third-country resettlement, given their short duration of exile. Therefore,




Figure 7
Percentage of Respondents Receiving Remittances

the geographical distribution of their remitters is largely constrained to South Sudan or other nearby sites, which limits their remitting capacity.

Access to Markets

The labour market, the market for goods and the finance market are underdeveloped both in Kalobeyei and in the newest part of Kakuma. By contrast, economic activities are flourishing in Kakuma town and in the oldest camp of Kakuma 1, but few recent arrivals are living there.

Labour Market

Few recent arrivals work for an income in Kakuma and Kalobeyei. Only 10 per cent of our interviewees reported having an activity to earn money. About 54 per cent of those working are employees and 46 per cent have their own business. The few jobs sometimes available are usually offered by NGOs: 65 per cent of employees are actually working for a Kenyan or international NGO as an incentive worker. Due to the government restrictions on refugees' right to work in the formal sector, about 5,000 'incentive workers' work full-time for UNHCR or its partners but are only given reduced 'incentive pay' of US\$50 to US\$80 per month rather than a salary. Incomes for those working are very low: the median monthly income is about US\$22 per

month and only one respondent reported earning more than US\$100 per month.

There are interesting differences between nationalities. Less than 10 per cent of South Sudanese recent arrivals are involved in economic activities in both Kalobeyei and Kakuma (see Figure 8). South Sudanese low levels of employment partly reflect low education levels and rural backgrounds. As one South Sudanese community leader who has been living in Kakuma camp for many years explained:

Most of them are relying on food rations. Very few are working. They often create a new family and put food together and share resources for survival Many of them are not educated, especially women Very few had a business background in South Sudan.¹²

Burundian refugees are more likely than others to work. They are engaged in very different sectors than the other three groups. While few are incentive workers, more than half of working Burundians are small-scale entrepreneurs. Many of them work as motorbike drivers, or have a shop or a restaurant. Often, these Burundians have found employment through other Burundian nationals in Kakuma camp. One of these Burundian refugees, who arrived in Kalobeyei in late 2016 through Rwanda and Uganda, now works as a boda boda driver for the owner of the motorbike and shares profit. He explained how he got this informal employment as follows:

I went to Kakuma camp and asked around for any jobs amongst Burundian communities there. He [the owner] gave me this work . . . I think most of boda boda drivers in Kalobeyei are employed by Burundian refugees in Kakuma.¹³

Ethiopians are also engaged in more entrepreneurial livelihoods than the South Sudanese, with almost 13 per cent of surveyed Ethiopians owning a medium or large business and another 10 per cent owning a small business (Figure 9).

Markets for Goods

Commercial markets are more developed in Kakuma—especially Kakuma 1—than in Kalobeyei. Regardless of nationality, refugees in Kalobeyei agree that Kakuma camp has much more established markets and better business opportunities.

Still, despite the fact that the Kalobeyei settlement is only two years old, several commercial markets have emerged there, mainly thanks to the Bamba Chakula programme promoted by WFP. Given the size of refugee populations in Kakuma and Kalobeyei, the scale of Bamba Chakula is considerable. The value of Bamba Chakula is about US\$500,000 per month in Kalobeyei and about US\$400,000 per month in Kakuma. This creates a significant market economy of Bamba Chakula. As of November 2017, there were 55 Bamba Chakula traders in Kalobeyei, consisting of 29 from Kenyan hosts, 16




Figure 8
Engaged in an Economic Activity




Figure 9
Type of Employment if Engaged in an Economic Activity

Kalobeyei-based refugees and 10 Kakuma-based refugees. By comparison, the number of Bamba Chakula retailers in Kakuma is about 200. The low number of Bamba Chakula retailers in Kalobeyei implies that their turnover is expected to be very large: about US\$10,000 per month per registered trader on average.

Despite their large turnover, most retail businesses in Kalobeyei rely on wholesalers operating in Kakuma town and camp. For instance, when asked about where he purchases shop items from, a Somali Ethiopian refugee who runs a retail grocery responded as follows: 'From Kakuma town. I carry items [from Kakuma town to Kalobeyei] by taxi or boda boda.'¹⁴

The Bamba Chakula market is not a free and competitive market. First, only a limited number of registered food retailers can sell goods in exchange for the electronic currency. Second, only food items can be purchased with the electronic currency. Third, Bamba Chakula money received by a refugee in Kalobeyei cannot be used to purchase goods in Kakuma. Fourth, WFP gives 'indicative prices' and organizes monthly meetings during which retailers are invited to agree on prices. This suggests that prices are not determined by the intersection of the supply-and-demand curve as in a competitive market.

WFP is aware of these restrictions. Some of them are justified by the fact that the Kenyan legislation does not allow an unrestricted cash-transfer system. WFP also argues that new businesses in Kalobeyei would not be able to compete with long-standing businesses in Kakuma without the restrictions:

While we advocate free market, we need to give protection for Kalobeyei markets. If big wholesalers from Kakuma or other places come to Kalobeyei, small traders will lose business immediately. They cannot compete with such large ones.¹⁵

However, these restrictions have implications on the distributions of wealth in Kakuma and Kalobeyei. First, restrictions are giving huge market power to retailers who have access to a Bamba Chakula licence. Not only do they have a very large average turnover thanks to barriers to entry, but collusion on prices is expected to lead to high mark-ups and higher prices for consumers. This is especially significant in Kalobeyei, where Bamba Chakula cash makes up most of the total economy and where Bamba Chakula retailers are few.

Second, the Bamba Chakula has affected business interactions between refugee and host populations. Before the creation of the Kalobeyei settlement and the start of the Bamba Chakula programme, the Turkana host community would often barter to trade firewood, charcoal or other resources against the food rations of refugees. In a way, the in-kind food-distribution programme favoured commercial interactions between the host and refugee communities. The restrictions on Bamba Chakula imply the bulk of the host community cannot access Bamba Chakula money (with the exception of

the host-community Bamba Chakula retailers), thereby limiting trade between refugee and host communities.

These observations raise questions about the fairness and redistributive impacts of the Bamba Chakula system. Doing a fully fledged analysis of the impacts and normative implications of Bamba Chakula restrictions is, however, beyond the scope of this article.

Finance

New arrivals suffer from a lack of access to finance in both Kakuma and Kalobeyei. At the time of the survey, access to formal credit and savings institutions was slightly better in Kakuma camp, given the presence of a branch of Equity Bank near its entrance. Many refugees have a bank account at the Equity Bank, which has plans to expand its operations to Kalobeyei. Although some aid organizations such as the Danish Refugee Council and the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) were starting to provide loan support in Kalobeyei settlement, the scale of such support was still in an infantile phase. In fact, only 1.2 per cent of interviewed refugees currently have credit from a bank, a microfinance institution, a private lender or any friend or family member.

In one focus-group interview, with evident frustration, South Sudanese refugees resonated how hard it is to get access to financial loans in Kenya:

Here access to credit is very limited During the civil war, we rushed to flee without carrying anything. Our first priority was physical survival. I could not go back to my shop [to carry savings with me] . . . I heard some NGOs are planning to give some loans but not sure about these schemes . . . I want to start business but I have no means to start off. I was a business person in South Sudan. If I can get initial capital, I will be able to run business to make money.¹⁶

Aid organizations are aware of this issue. One NGO worker commented: 'Most refugees in Kalobeyei do not have saving or credit access. There are many refugees with good business ideas but they don't have access to capital.'¹⁷

Access to Public Goods

Access to public goods, such as health care, water, education, electricity, security or roads, is limited in both Kalobeyei and Kakuma. If anything, the situation is slightly worse in Kalobeyei because some infrastructure has yet to be constructed.

Respondents reported limited access to health care. No significant difference in the perception of access exists between the two sites (Figure 10). Interestingly, a considerable number of refugees from Kalobeyei seek care in Kakuma: 11 per cent of Kalobeyei residents who had travelled to Kakuma in the week preceding the survey did so for medical reasons.




Figure 10 (a) Average Response to Statement 'I Have Access to Affordable and Good-quality Healthcare'. (b) Average Response to Statement 'I Have Access to Water'

Access to water is also limited in both sites. But the lack of water is felt more acutely by refugees in Kalobeyei because of the greater importance of agriculture. Water shortages constrain agricultural livelihoods. While a considerable number of refugees are engaged in kitchen-garden activities, almost all complained that their yield is severely limited by lack of water. For households involved in agriculture, 90 per cent cite lack of access to water as one of their challenges. For those not yet involved in agriculture but willing to be, 95 per cent cite lack of water as a barrier. Occasional water shortages also force refugees to use Turkana water sources. This has resulted in tension between refugees and the host community, the latter of whom believe that refugees may be polluting their wells inadvertently. Aid agencies are aware of problems related to limited access to water. A UNHCR staff member commented as below:

Access to water in Kalobeyei is very limited. Borehole and underground water do not work. We could not locate any alternative ways to secure water. Building a dam may be an option.¹⁸

The situation of access to education is mixed. On the one hand, most children go to school. We collected survey data on up to three children randomly selected within households. In Kakuma, only 9 per cent of South Sudanese households had at least one child over the age of five who is not attending school (Figure 11). This percentage is 13 per cent in Kalobeyei, but the difference is not statistically significant at conventional thresholds. School attendance is more limited for Burundian and Ethiopian children in Kalobeyei. Still, 89 per cent of children from our sample attend school. Access to adult education is also relatively good, especially in Kakuma. In Kakuma, 77 per cent of South Sudanese recent arrivals from our sample agree with the statement 'I have access to further education or vocational training', whereas the percentage is 49 per cent in Kalobeyei (Figure 12). In Kakuma, 54 per cent of South Sudanese respondents are currently attending some form of formal education. In Kalobeyei, this percentage is lower: around 32 per cent of South Sudanese, 23 per cent of Ethiopians and fewer than 5 per cent of Burundians are currently attending some form of formal education. Attendance is negatively correlated with arrival date (Figure 13). In fact, the difference between Kalobeyei and Kakuma seems to be mostly due to the fact that Kakuma refugees arrived earlier and had hence more time to enrol (Figure 13b).

On the other hand, the number of schools is insufficient to accommodate all pupils, especially in Kalobeyei, implying that schools are extremely congested. UNHCR and other agencies have acknowledged the imminent need for more and better educational facilities. According to refugee teachers in Kalobeyei, one classroom has to accommodate more than 300 students. The school is especially taxed because it must accommodate both refugee and host-community pupils.




Figure 11
Percentage of Households with at Least One Out-of-school Child




Figure 12
Average Response to Statement 'I Have Access to Further Education or Vocational Training'




Figure 13
(a) Percentage of Adult Refugees Accessing Further Education in Each Sub-sample. (b) Percentage of South Sudanese Adult Refugees Accessing Further Education by Arrival Date

The red dashed line represents the first cut-off date (24 May 2016). The 81 observations after the second cut-off date have been dropped.

Access to other public goods is poor in both Kalobeyi and Kakuma. For example, only 3 per cent of households have access to electricity. In both sites, refugees complained about security. There is no statistically significant difference in the self-reported level of security between Kalobeyi and Kakuma. The quality of the road infrastructure is poor in both sites.

Self-reliance Outcomes

The category ‘self-reliance outcomes’ has two components (Figure 2): (i) a series of socio-economic outcomes that includes protection, food, water, shelter, personal safety, health and education and (ii) the degree of autonomy when satisfying these outcomes. In the previous section, we have shown that, in both Kalobeyi and Kakuma, access to water is limited, shelters are rudimentary, refugees feel insecure and access to education is acceptable, especially for adults, but classrooms are overcrowded. In this section, we therefore focus on food—the only socio-economic outcome listed in the definition of self-reliance that has not been discussed so far—and on the perception of autonomy.

We consider three outcome variables related to nutritional status and one variable related to autonomy. First, we measure dietary diversity using the individual Dietary Diversity Score, which measures the number of different food groups that individuals consumed over the week preceding the survey (out of 12 food groups). The individual Dietary Diversity Score is a good proxy measure of the nutritional quality of an individual’s diet. More generally, this indicator is expected to correlate with the household socio-economic level (Headey and Ecker 2013). As shown in Figure 14, diets appear to be significantly more diverse in Kalobeyi compared to Kakuma. The difference between South Sudanese recent arrivals in Kakuma and Kalobeyi mainly stems from vegetables and fish, which are more frequently consumed in Kalobeyi. Dietary diversity is especially high for Ethiopian refugees, who are more likely to consume meat, milk (usually from camels) and sugar than other groups.

Second, we consider the Food Consumption Score (FCS), which is a composite score that aggregates information on dietary diversity, food frequency and relative nutritional importance. Household consumption is then categorized as poor when the score is below 21, borderline when the score is between 21 and 35, and acceptable when the score is above 35. Previous research has shown that the FCS correlates well with caloric availability at the household level (Wiesmann *et al.* 2009). Figure 15 shows that only 58 per cent of South Sudanese recent arrivals living in Kakuma would be classified as having an acceptable score according to this metric. In contrast, in Kalobeyi, 76 per cent of South Sudanese refugees, 66 per cent of Burundian refugees and 73 per cent of Ethiopian refugees would be classified as having an acceptable score.




Figure 14
Individual Dietary Diversity Score




Figure 15
Percentage of Households with an 'Acceptable' (>35) Food Consumption Score

Third, we measured food insecurity using the Household Food Insecurity Access Prevalence (HFIAP), which aggregates respondents' perceptions of food vulnerability and the frequency with which shortages occurred (Coates *et al.* 2007). In Kalobeyei, 78 per cent of South Sudanese households, 90 per cent of Burundian households and 84 per cent of Ethiopian households are classified as food-insecure, compared with 93 per cent of South Sudanese recent arrivals in Kakuma (Figure 16).

Finally, we measured refugees' perceived dependency on aid using the question: 'How dependent do you think your household is on support from UNHCR, WFP or any other NGO?' (Figure 17). South Sudanese recent arrivals in Kakuma report being the most dependent on aid: 90 per cent said they are 'completely dependent'. By contrast, this percentage is 73 per cent for the South Sudanese in Kalobeyei, 16 per cent for the Burundian and 37 per cent for the Ethiopian.

Overall, the quality and availability of food seem to be better in Kalobeyei, despite the fact that the settlement is more recent. Furthermore, refugees perceive themselves as slightly more autonomous in Kalobeyei. Why is this the case? The analysis of self-reliance-enabling factors above suggests that recent arrivals in Kalobeyei settlement and Kakuma camp are living in a similarly difficult environment characterized by limited access to assets, a low level of remittances, underdeveloped labour and financial markets, and limited access to public goods. If anything, the situation is actually slightly better in Kakuma because markets are more developed and refugees arrived earlier than in Kalobeyei. The main difference between the two sites relates to the wider scope of the Bamba Chakula and kitchen-garden programmes in Kalobeyei. More research is needed to determine the impact of these two programmes on self-reliance outcomes.

Conclusion

Kalobeyei represents an innovative model within the global refugee system: a settlement designed from scratch in order to support self-reliance for refugees and enhanced interaction with host communities. It is viewed by UNHCR as a model with the potential to be replicated. But it is a model that will evolve iteratively, with new programmes being created on an ongoing basis, allowing research to shape its long-term trajectory.

The settlement also represents a rare methodological opportunity. This is because South Sudanese recent arrivals were allocated to either the old Kakuma model or the new Kalobeyei model based on their date of arrival, with discrete cut-off dates, rather than criteria relating to population characteristics. It has therefore offered us with a quasi-experimental opportunity to assess what difference, if any, the Kalobeyei model may have made to self-reliance outcomes for newly arrived South Sudanese refugees.

Starting from UNHCR's definition of self-reliance, we conceptualized self-reliance as a process through which self-reliance inputs (a combination of




Figure 16
Percentage of Households that are Severely Food-insecure




Figure 17
Average Perceived Dependency on NGOs for Support

enabling factors and aid programmes) are turned into self-reliance outcomes (socio-economic outcomes and autonomy).

After just 15 months, we find that self-reliance-enabling factors—namely the environment, assets, networks, markets and public goods—were similarly limited for refugees in both Kakuma and Kalobeyi and, in some cases, very slightly worse in Kalobeyi. The only important differences between the two sites relate to the aid model: the extent of agriculture and of the Bamba Chakula system of cash transfer is much greater in Kalobeyi compared to that in Kakuma. This, though, is in many ways what we might expect just 15 months after the creation of a settlement with a 14-year strategy. The project strategy divides into several ‘phases’ and the first phase envisages ‘building structures and infrastructure, piloting of economic and livelihood activities’ (EU 2016: 5). Immediately following our research, new projects and programmes were already being implemented. For example, UNHCR launched the first ‘cash-for-shelter’ programme in a refugee camp in 2018, allocating US\$1,450 to refugee households to select between alternative shelter designs commissioned from local construction companies.

We did, however, find better nutritional outcomes and greater perceived autonomy in Kalobeyi. We hypothesize that refugees’ better nutritional status in Kalobeyi could be due to observed differences in the aid model. Agriculture is indeed likely to lead to increased dietary intake and dietary diversity. Similarly, cash assistance is expected to lead to better dietary diversity than in-kind aid, as recipients of cash can select the items they want to eat. The expected effect of cash assistance on the quantity of food eaten and on food security is ambiguous. Various mechanisms could be at play. For example, recipients of Bamba Chakula could select less nutritious food or could face difficulties in managing their budget. But the content of food rations is not varied and is often viewed as undesirable by refugees: recipients of in-kind aid often sell their food rations at low prices in order to access cash. More research would be needed to determine whether differences in nutritional status and perceived autonomy between Kalobeyi and Kakuma can be attributed to Bamba Chakula and kitchen-garden programmes.

Given the planned sequencing of interventions, our findings might be interpreted with cautious optimism: after just 15 months, some positive changes are observable and they could be attributable to new aspects of the Kalobeyi aid model. But, if the aim is self-reliance, which not only entails acceptable socio-economic outcomes, but also autonomy, our findings suggest that the next phases of KISED P should focus on strengthening enabling factors. The challenge is that, while aid agencies can influence aid models, many of the enabling factors for self-reliance rely upon influencing the behaviour of other actors: the business sector, the government, refugees, diasporas and the host community, for example.

The implication for refugee policy is that successful attempts to ‘design’ for self-reliance will rely upon having a much improved conceptual, methodological and empirical basis on which to understand the causal connections

between the different component elements of self-reliance and their sequencing over time. Translating these understandings into practical change will also rely upon influencing the behaviour of a range of actors beyond aid agencies. Kalobeyei therefore represents a fascinating case study from which we can learn more about both the theory and the practice of self-reliance.

1. In what follows, we use the term 'Kalobeyei' to refer to the settlement (not Kalobeyei town) and the term 'Kakuma' to refer to the four Kakuma camps (not Kakuma town).
2. https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/horn-africa/kenya/regional-development-and-protection-programme-kenya-support-kalobeyei_en (accessed June 2019).
3. A first version of this diagram was built before the fieldwork to inform the construction of the survey instruments. This first version is shown in Betts *et al.* (2018). The main difference between the original version and the version presented in this article is the addition of the concept of 'autonomy'.
4. Interview, Kakuma, 16 November 2017.
5. It is important to note that the local Turkana population is not a homogeneous community, but a highly stratified society, divided along lines of livelihood, education, material wealth and identity. For details, see Rodgers (2017).
6. Interview, Kakuma, 16 November 2017.
7. Focus-group discussion, Kalobeyei, 12 November 2017.
8. Interview, Kalobeyei, 15 November 2017.
9. Focus-group discussion, Kalobeyei, 11 November 2017.
10. Focus-group discussion, Kalobeyei, 11 November 2017.
11. Interview, Kalobeyei, 15 November 2017.
12. Focus-group discussion, Kakuma, 7 November 2017.
13. Interview, Kalobeyei, 13 November 2017.
14. Interview, Kalobeyei, 12 November 2017.
15. Interview, Kakuma, 8 November 2017.
16. Focus-group discussion, Kalobeyei, 11 November 2017.
17. Interview, Kakuma, 16 November 2017.
18. Interview, Nairobi, 23 November 2017.

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